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"INTEREST" ARBITRATION REVISITEDt
Robben W. Fleming*
In the years that the National Academy of Arbitrators has been
in existence, we have often talked about the difference between
"rights" and "interests" arbitration.' And in doing so we have
invariably wound up assuring ourselves that arbitration of
"rights," i.e., the determination of grievances which arose out of
the ongoing terms of the contract, was a true act of statesmanship,
while arbitration of "interests," i.e., the determination of the substantive terms of a new contract, was unsound, unwise, and probably un-American.
The essence of what I have to say today is that it is time to
rethink our position on "interest" arbitration, though I would
prefer that experimentation take place in a voluntary,
non-governmental context. It is not so much that we were clearly
wrong in our prior conclusions, as it is that it is not clear that we
were right, or if we were, that the conditions which warranted that
conclusion are the same. The labor relations process is a dynamic
one in which neither the problems nor the remedies can remain
static.
Perhaps it is wise to start the analysis with a review of why we
have always thought there was such a difference between "rights"
and "interest" arbitration.
The "rights" which we were determining under contracts were,
after all, but interpretations of an agreement which the parties had
t The text is that of a speech presented on April 6, 1973, at the Annual Meeting of the
National Academy of Arbitrators in Atlanta, Georgia. This speech also appears in ARBITRATION OF INTEREST DISPUTES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, copyright © 1973 by The Bureau of

National Affairs, Inc., and is reproduced here by permission.
* President of the University of Michigan and Professor of Law. B.A., 1938, Beloit
College; LL. B., 194 1, University of Wisconsin.
1 The literature on the subject of "interest" arbitration is extensive. For discussions of
the subject, see, e.g., Aksen, The Impetus To Contract Arbitration in the Public Area, in
PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
LABOR 103 (1972); Boynton, Industrial Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: Be-

cause It's There?, 21 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 568 (1972); Feller, The Impetus To Contract
Arbitration In the Private Area, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 79 (1972); Hines, Mandatory Contract Arbitration-Is It a Viable Process, 25 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 533 (1972);
McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of

Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192 (1972); Sinicropi & Gilroy, The
Legal Framework of Public Sector Dispute Resolution, 28 ARB. J. (n.s.) I (1973); Stevens,
The Analytics of Voluntary Arbitration: Contract Disputes, 7 IND. REL. 68 (1967).
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written. They had, therefore, reached an understanding about
where their basic interests lay and our decisions were therefore
tolerated only within the limits of the contract. Moreover, there
were advantages to both companies and unions in getting the rules
of the game established under impartial auspices. It tended to
remove some of the inevitable capriciousness within any system
and the results were rarely devastating.
"Interest" arbitration, on the other hand, was regarded as a
much more "iffy" proposition. The "rules of the game" were very
vague indeed. Were profitability or unprofitability proper criteria,
and, if so, how were they to be applied? What about the
cost-of-living, comparative wage scales and fringes, foreign competition, employment in the industry, inflation, and relative positions in the wage and salary hierarchy? We did not, and in the
absence of agreement of the parties, still do not, I suspect, know
how to deal with those questions. Thus "interest" arbitration is
hard to implement. But on further reflection at least two serious
questions arise: 1) have we exaggerated the difficulties involved in
"interest" arbitration; and/or 2) have conditions changed so that
regardless of the difficulties we ought to rethink our whole attitude
towards "interest" arbitration? I am inclined to think that the
answer to both questions is "yes," and most of the rest of what I
have to say is an attempt to justify my conclusions.
When I was writing articles in the labor law field I would
occasionally persuade a faculty colleague totally outside the labor
field to read something I had written before it was published. One
insight I gained from this was the realization that the great
self-evident truths on which "experts" in any field nurture themselves are not as self-evident to other people who work in a
different field. I never had much success, for instance, in explaining to them just why "interest" arbitration was more difficult than
the extraordinary range of economic and social problen - with
which courts and administrative agencies already deal. Hov , I ask
you, have you convinced others that the whole economic structure of public utilities is properly considered in determining rates,
but wages cannot be determined except through bargaining which
may culminate in a strike? Would you contend that the public has
no interest in wage rates, which must be considered in the rate
determinations, or no interest in uninterrupted service?
And on closer examination, is the difference between "interest"
and "rights" arbitration as sharp as we say it is? We all know that
labor agreements are frequently written in ambiguous terms because the parties chose that path in the hope that a day of
reckoning would never come. It is no surprise to any of us that in
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permanent umpire situations the parties have often preferred
vague contract language, whose interpretation will be left to a
trusted umpire, rather than bog-down in negotiations over something on which they cannot exactly agree.
Finally, it is simply not credible to say that "interest" disputes
are not arbitrable when we see the courts dealing with infinitely
more complex social questions, like the integration of schools and
the 'right to an abortion. If there is a good reason for further
avoiding "interest" arbitration, it cannot be that such disputes are
too difficult. It would strike much nearer to the truth to say that in
a complex economy like ours the bargaining mechanism, however
imperfect, is more likely to reach a result which is viable than any
set of third-party decisions. If this is the real reason, perhaps we
need to look again at how the climate of bargaining is changing.
The American scene in the year 1973 is very different from the
industrial world which most of us have known over the past
quarter century.
Until very recent years we were far and away the most sophisticated industrialized nation in the world. We were blessed with
great natural resources; a tremendous, coherent domestic market;
a technology superior to any in the world; a strong creditor
position in world markets; the most respected currency in the
world; and an enormous self-confidence about our capabilities.
Today's world looks very different, some of it, certainly, permanently so. The resurgent German and Japanese industrial economies can hold their own against us anywhere, and with England
now in the common market, a unified Europe can be an enormous
market and competitor. Our natural resources are dwindling, and
in areas like oil, iron ore and paper pulp we now depend heavily
on imports. Our domestic market remains intact, except that
foreign competition is much stiffer. Our technology is superb, but
the pressure for greater productivity continually erodes the employment base, and government, which furnished so much of the
increased employment in the last ten years is now cutting back or
looking for technological aid in displacing costly employees. Our
creditor position in world markets has changed to a serious debtor
position for which we have not so far found a remedy. Our
currency is under serious international pressure. And our selfconfidence has been replaced by self-doubts.
There are a number of other changes in our society which
deserve attention in thinking about "interest" arbitration.
The role which the federal government plays in the economy
from its tax power base is incalculable. Whether one is talking
employment (direct or indirect), purchasing power as it impacts
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on private industry, subsidies of wide-ranging enterprises, or the
current economic controls, we are in a whole new world. Incidentally, there are a good many distinguished economists with
affiliations in both major political parties, who believe that economic controls of some kind are due to be with us almost permanently. The fact that one finds highly placed spokesmen in both
Labor and Management who openly acknowledge the need for
such controls perhaps speaks to us more eloquently than anything
else about our changed circumstances.
Another new dimension of our labor-management scene is
union organization of public employees, which is now widespread.
A big argument at the outset of the advent of public employee
unionism was, and to some extent still is, whether the strike was a
legitimate weapon against public employers. Though such strikes
remain illegal in most jurisdictions, their use has not been eschewed. Some of us argued that such a development was inevitable-indeed it had a precedent in Western Europe where
public employees had long been organized. Nevertheless, we
would do well to remember that George Taylor, 2 that wise and
good friend to whom so many of us owe a debt we can never
repay, was adamantly opposed to the use of the strike against
public employers.
This is not the place to argue either public employee unionism
or the use of the strike. But it may be the place to point out the
employment of the strike in the public sector is inevitably going a
long ways to convince the public that the strike may not be the
most rational way to settle labor disputes. If we have learned any
lesson from these last turbulent years, it is that the public vastly
prefers order to chaos. The spectacle of cities strangling in trash
and garbage because the municipal government and the employees union cannot come to terms, or the closing of public schools
for intolerable periods during the school year cannot continue.
Increasingly people are going to ask why, when other kinds of
disputes are settled in an orderly fashion, labor disputes, particularly in the public sector, cannot be.
It is an oversimplification, of course, to suppose that there is no
problem in resolving public disputes once we resort to what
Willard Wirtz3 rather whimsically called "mediation to finality." If
that was all there was to it, we would have gone to public employee "interest" arbitration long ago. What do you do if, however
2The late professor emeritus, Wharton School of Finance, University of Pennsylvania;
Chairman, National War Labor Board, 1945.
3 Former U.S. Secretary of Labor 1962-69.
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justified the union's claim, the city is bankrupt? And suppose the
taxpayers simply will not pass a millage increase.
It is obviously unfair to ask public employees to subsidize a
public service by working under unfair conditions. Arbitration can
be conducted under reasonable criteria. If the result is made
binding the public has three choices: 1) pay the bill, 2) accept a
diminution in services, or 3) find a way to increase the productivity of its public servants through the substitution of technology or
otherwise. That still leaves a class of cases where the local public
may be willing to let services deteriorate below a tolerable level
because it has another alternative, as in certain school cases.
Those cases are limited and are going to have to be resolved in a
different manner. A number of state governors are proposing
revisions in the tax structure to cope with the school problem, and
some state courts have cast constitutional doubts on the present
property tax as a way of financing public schools.
Some public employers will find this analysis as unacceptable
as will the unions which represent their employees. Nevertheless,
they assume a prerogative which is not wholly theirs. We are
talking about public employment, and I emphasize the word "public." The service is one required by the public, paid for by the
public, and consumed by the public. But the public cannot ethically require of its employees that they work at substandard rates
while at the same time being deprived of their strike weapon.
Likewise, the public can make intelligible decisions about the
quality of the services it is willing to finance only if it is aware of,
and willing to pay the going price for such services. There is no
inherent right on the part of an employee organization to insist
that the public finance a level of services which it is unwilling to
pay for, though the state clearly has a right to require a minimum
level of services.
If "interest" arbitration is justified in the public service, the
question inevitably arises as to whether and to what extent this
should extend to the private sector, particularly if the submission
is voluntary. By and large both labor and management have been
adamantly opposed to such an approach in the past. Some still
are, but I am not so sure they should be, and the recent steel
agreement represents a major breakthrough. There is an increasingly fine line between the public and private sectors. Large
segments of industry are supported by government contracts.
Others are simply government owned but privately operated. And
in any event we are living in a brand new economic climate.
Arbitration of "interest" disputes is not a panacea, and if the
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parties turn to it I am not so sure that it can, or should, last for too
long a period. We know from the experience of the last twenty
years that government, qua government is not a very good source
of decision-making in these kinds of affairs. That is why I would
prefer "interest" arbitration in the hands of independent professional arbitrators. It would give the process a flexibility which it
cannot have in government hands, and it would give the parties a
choice over their decision-makers.
We have, I think, been going through one of the great watershed periods in American history. Much as we would like to
return to the past, we cannot do so. The collective bargaining
process, including arbitration as we have known it, will not be
immune from influence by the tides of change which now engulf
us.

The year 1973 will be one of those years when major labor
contracts will once again be open. Perhaps they will be settled
without strikes, certainly some of them will. But what about those
that will not? I would argue that they ought not to go to a
crippling strike, and that the parties, of their own volition, ought
to resort to arbitration. In this period of government economic
guidelines, which I view as both necessary and desirable, I suspect the government ought to be invited to present its view before
any such tribunal. The decision would be subject to government
scrutiny in any event.
The suggestion before a National Academy of Arbitrators audience that "interest" arbitration be expanded will appear to some
as a blatant appeal to self-interest, since it is the members of the
Academy who would doubtless hear many of the cases. In truth,
you and I know that arbitrators do not much like hearing "interest" cases. There have been too few benchmarks to mark the
way, and too little confidence in our own wisdom to decide such
cases. We may not have increased much in wisdom, but the other
alternatives hold even less attraction at this moment in time.
I have always thought that there is one absolutely iron law
about dynamic social processes. It is that things can never remain
the same over long periods of time. Collective bargaining today is
not the same process we knew in the post World War II days.
Neither is the social or economic climate in which it exists. And
in another twenty-five years, it will not be what it is now.
If I am right that now is the time for private parties to experiment much more broadly than they have in the past in "interest"
arbitration, it may be that such experiments should be, and will be
discontinued after a period. Time and events will change and even
the good idea of today may be better discarded tomorrow.

FALL

19731

Interest Arbitration

7

It is time to revisit the precincts of "interest" arbitration. Some
.new neighbors have moved into the area and we ought to get
acquainted with them.

